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Abstract
In most developing countries, a huge proportion of the na-
tional food basket is supported by small subsistence agricul-
tural systems. A major challenge to these systems is disease
and pest attacks which have a devastating effect on the small-
holder farmers that depend on these systems for their liveli-
hoods. A key component of any proposed solution is a good
disease surveillance network. However, current surveillance
efforts are unable to provide sufficient data for monitoring
such phenomena over a vast geographic area efficiently and
effectively due to limited resources, both human and finan-
cial. Crowdsourcing with farmer crowds that have access to
mobile phones offers a viable option to provide all year round
real-time surveillance data on viral disease and pest incidence
and severity. This work presents a mobile ad hoc surveillance
system for monitoring viral diseases and pests in cassava.
We present results from a pilot in Uganda where this sys-
tem was deployed for 76 weeks. We discuss the participation
behaviours of the crowds with mobile smartphones as well as
the effects of several incentives applied.
Introduction
Real-time surveillance forms the basis for effective crop
health monitoring and disease detection. In Uganda, where
viral disease attacks on crops are one of the leading causes
of food insecurity and poverty, having a functional surveil-
lance system is critical. In this work, we focus on the cas-
sava crop (Manihot esculenta), an important food security
crop for Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions. Cassava is
the second most important food and security crop in Sub-
Saharan Africa especially amongst smallholder farmers be-
cause it can easily be grown in poor soils and requires few
inputs. Although cassava is known to survive under harsh
conditions, its yield is greatly affected by pests and viral dis-
eases (Nuwamanya et al. 2015; Otim-Nape et al. 2000).
Currently, surveillance is done by experts from the na-
tional agricultural organisation in Uganda, who will every
year conduct a national cassava disease and pest survey. This
generally entails inspection of gardens at specific intervals
(of about 10Km) along drivable main roads, covering only
small proportions of the areas of interest in major districts.
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Because they have to work within limited budgets, this sur-
vey may be delayed or fewer regions sampled in a particular
year. These expert surveys whilst providing an annual snap-
shot of the health of cassava across the country, are limited
in their ability to provide real-time actionable surveillance
data.
In many other fields, citizen science has proven to be a
good intervention to supplement long-term focused systems
such as the surveillance system employed in Uganda (Sil-
vertown 2009). Citizen science and more specifically crowd-
sourcing can be employed to supplement such a system by
providing ad hoc data input from citizens or crowds nearer
to the phenomenon of interest. In the Ugandan case, small-
holder farmers and extension service workers who are on
ground in the various regions of the country can provide sup-
plemental surveillance data more frequently and more effi-
ciently using smartphones.
A key facilitator to this process is mobile telephony.
The ubiquity of mobile phones in developing countries
presents a unique opportunity to leverage crowdsourcing
for this type of problem, and several example implemen-
tations of this already exist (Chatzimilioudis et al. 2012;
Agapie, Teevan, and Monroy-Herna´ndez 2015). Mobile crop
surveillance in areas where it is resource infeasible to sur-
vey regularly offers a viable option for effective crop sens-
ing, enabling experts to conduct surveillance tasks more ef-
fectively while at the same time crowdsourcing surveillance
reports from farmers local to these areas to inform interven-
tions in a timely manner.
This paper presents the mobile ad hoc surveillance sys-
tem, which uses a crowdsourcing setup for farmer and expert
crowds with mobile smartphones for monitoring of cassava
viral diseases and pests in Uganda. The sections that follow
describe the related work in this domain, the implementation
of the crowdsourcing system used, the incentives employed
in this setup and some lessons and experiences from running
this set up for 76 weeks in Uganda.
Related Work
In this age of big data, there is an ever increasing need to
build applications whose strength lies to a significant degree
on the amount of data used to train the system. For such sys-
tem it quickly becomes infeasible for a small team of experts
to collect all the data. Citizen science and crowdsourcing
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applications are thus becoming increasingly important in ac-
complishing this task (Kittur et al. 2013), some notable early
examples in the field including Open Mind Common Sense
(OMCS) (Singh et al. 2002) and LEARNER (Chklovski
2003) where knowledge is collected from a crowd of min-
imally skilled volunteers. More recently we have Amazon
Mechnanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010)
and Crowdflower (Van Pelt and Sorokin 2012) as examples
of popular large scale crowdsourcing platforms.
This work is broadly enshrined under the Knowledge
Collection from Volunteer Contributors (KCVC) (Chklovski
and Gil 2005) which is more aptly enshrined under the broad
themes of crowdsourcing and collective intelligence (Quinn
and Bederson 2011). A significant component of the work
falls under the human computation field as well since the
contributors in this system have to provide some analysis
of the image they are uploading. Because we presently do
not evaluate how accurate these particular analyses are, the
work we present here mainly focuses on the crowdsourcing
aspect. We see several parallels in our work with work done
on organizing the crowd in focused groups (Zhu, Kraut, and
Kittur 2012) and the more related discipline of voluteered
geographical information (VGI) (Haklay 2013). Several ex-
amples however of applying crowdsourcing with incentives
for human computation tasks exist including (Kanefsky,
Barlow, and Gulick 2001) where the crowd was used to clas-
sify craters from images of Mars.
A key component of this work is the ability to leverage
the ubiquity of smartphone technology particularly in the
African context. Mobile phone sensing offers a variety
of novel, efficient ways to opportunistically collect data,
enabling numerous mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS)
applications. Examples from alternate fields include (Mo-
han, Padmanabhan, and Ramjee 2008) and (Thiagarajan et
al. 2009) where systems are developed for crowdsourcing
traffic information. More related examples to our cassava
disease sensing application include the use of crowds and
communities in noise pollution sensing (Rana et al. 2010)
and in air pollution sensing (Stevens and DHondt 2010). An
even closer example of a system using different incentives to
link credible buyers to sellers of market produce in Uganda
is the Kudu system (Ssekibuule, Quinn, and Leyton-Brown
2013) which uses a double auction design algorithm to link
buyers and sellers of agricultural produce.
Mobile Ad hoc Surveillance system (AdSurv)
For this particular project, we implemented a crowdsourcing
mobile phone based ad hoc surveillance system (AdSurv)
that enables farmers, extension workers and agricultural ex-
perts provide near real-time geo-tagged surveillance data for
monitoring cassava crop health across Uganda. The data col-
lected is in the form of geo-coded images of plants in gar-
dens in the locality of the collector. These reports update a
national cassava situation map.
The current operation of the system involves the crowd-
sourcer broadcasting a surveillance task of a subject of in-
terest to the agents. This is done through the crowdsourcing
application on the mobile phone that the collector is using
to transmit the data. Based on this probe from the crowd-
sourcer, the collector sends in images and text data pertain-
ing to the request. A typical request could be ”this week send
images of cassava crops in your vicinity exhibiting Cassava
Mosaic Disease”. The response to this would be the farmer
or extension worker visiting different fields in his locality
and sending images of plants exhibiting the disease.
Since we follow a typical Knowledge Collection from
Volunteer Contributors (KCVC) methodology (Chklovski
and Gil 2005), we compensate the collectors with mobile
phone data credit, micro payments or other types of in-
centives. In later sections we discuss these incentives in
greater detail. For this work we carried out a pilot span-
ning 76 weeks with several farmers and extension workers
in Uganda. The initial goal was to use a KCVC model to
crowdsource image data to aid in the real-time surveillance
of disease as well as to inform the development of algo-
rithms to automatically classify disease. The pilot was not
designed initially to study the effect of different incentives
though this became very important as the pilot went on. As
such our assertions in this paper are mainly on the conjec-
ture side of the line, though we believe the paper presents
strong evidence to support some known theories on crowd-
sourcing, particularly seeing as this was applied to solve a
real problem.
The pilot
The Adsurv crowdsourcing system was piloted in several
regions of Uganda to provide evidence of the utility of a
crowdsourced surveillance data to inform actionable inter-
ventions. The contributors in the pilot were selected to in-
clude subject matter experts, extension personnel and cas-
sava farmers from across the country. Three types of image
data were identified by the national agricultural organisa-
tion in Uganda as being of priority for this system. These
included images of cassava plants manifesting disease, im-
ages of cassava pests e.g. whiteflies and finally images of
anomalous manifestations on cassava plants in the gardens.
The anomalous images were particularly important for pro-
viding early warning signals about a potential new disease
outbreak. The system was set up to upload the data to a cen-
tralized server.
In total the pilot included 29 participants from the differ-
ent regions of Uganda. Figure 2a shows the map of Uganda
and the corresponding contributions from the different re-
gions. As is evident there was a relatively good spatial cov-
erage of the country. A key reason for this as well is that the
cassava experts in their ordinary duties also traverse the dif-
ferent regions of Uganda and during these trips, they were
also able to send in image data from these various locations.
This improved the coverage of the system.
In week 1 of the pilot, the 29 participants were given a one
day training which mainly involved training on the smart-
phones distributed to them, demonstration of the system, a
field test of the system. Protocols and modalities of what
data and how often to send the data were discussed. A sec-
ond refresher training took place in week 64 of the pilot were
the participants were trained on new features of the applica-
tion including a better notification system for notifying them
of the weeks data collection target. At this training, 15 best
performing participants were in invited (as an incentive).
The AdSurv crowdsourcing eco-system
The AdSurv crowdsourcing system was made up of four key
entities including (i) the crowd consisting of the contribu-
tors, (ii) the crowdsourcer who seeks the knowledge and
wisdom of the crowd, (iii) the crowdsourcing task which
is the activity in which the crowd participates and (iv) the
crowdsourcing platform which is the system that uses the
mobile phone network to make communication between the
crowd and the crowdsourcer possible. We expound on these
four entities highlighting how we instantiated them for the
pilot.
The Crowd: The AdSurv system was deployed country-
wide by availing mobile smartphones with the application to
experts, extension workers and farmers, located across 4 of
the target 6 agricultural sub-regions of country. A total of 29
persons were equipped with a smartphone. The smartphones
were pre-installed with the AdSurv crowdsourcing app and
the volunteers were trained on how to use the the app for
collecting and transmitting data. The over-arching goal was
to evaluate our hypothesis that a crowd consisting of small-
holder farmers and extension experts can supply near real-
time surveillance data particularly for times when informa-
tion about the same is lacking for example in the periods
between the standard national surveillance surveys.
For this pilot, the crowd consisted of four categories of
participants or agents, all with varying expertise and pro-
files. These included farmers, crop experts, extension ser-
vice members, and the partner agents to the National Crops
Resources Research Institute (NaCRRI) the Uganda govern-
ment body that is in charge of cassava crop disease surveil-
lance. A concise description of each group follows.
1. Farmers - these were small-holder farmers in the four ma-
jor agro-ecological zones of the country that have com-
munities growing cassava.
2. Experts - these were cassava crop subject matter experts
who conduct survey related tasks as one of their research
duties.
3. Extension service workers - these included district based
officers for example district agricultural inspectors or dis-
trict production officers whose work it is to routinely visit
and inspect farmer fields and to disseminate information
on farming best practices.
4. Partner agents - these were non-governmental extension
service support workers who support the agricultural sec-
tor in Uganda. Their roles and duties are largely similar to
the extension service.
The Crowdsourcer: The crowdsourcer also known as the
principal, is the institution that requests the data or can make
use of the data. In our case, the cassava disease surveillance
task is the mandate of the the Cassava Regional Centre of
Excellence at the National Crops Resources Research Insti-
tute (NaCRRI). Together with the Artificial Intelligence and
Data Science Research Lab at Makerere University, these
Figure 1: The AdSurv crowdsourcing system.
formed the crowdsourcer. The role of the crowdsourcer is
to provide the technical equipment, incentives for partici-
pation, and define the survey tasks to be completed by the
crowd.
The crowdsourcing task: In the case of our pilot, the
crowdsourcer publishes weekly crowdsourcing tasks on
surveillance subjects of interest. For the pilot, the surveil-
lance subjects mainly included tasks to collect images of
plants depicting cassava viral diseases like Cassava Mosaic
Disease, or pests like Cassava African Whitefly and Cassava
Green Mite, or disease symptoms e.g. necrotised root sec-
tions of cassava. Other tasks included submission of statis-
tics on numbers of cassava farmers in a village and cassava
yield, among others.
Every report related to a particular crowdsourcing task in-
cluded four attributes; (i) the image of the subject of inter-
est, e.g. a diseased leaf, (ii) textual data specifying the type
of image which could be a disease manifesting image, or a
pest image, or an anomalous image, (iii) a comment from
the participant or agent highlighting their understanding of
the image they are uploading, and (iv) the GPS reading of
the area where the image was taken. A complete report is
one with all these four attributes accounted for.
The crowdsourcing platform: This consists the actual
mobile ad hoc surveillance system which includes, the
smartphone application, the backend server and a web in-
terface to the server system. The next section describes the
system components in detail.
AdSurv system architecture
The Adhoc surveillance system consists three components
that ensure its robust functionality; the AdSurv Android app,
back-end server and a web interface to allow interaction with
the system. Figure 1 gives a depiction of the system.
AdSurv Android app: The AdSurv platform consists of a
smartphone based Android application, called Adsurv, used
for the data collection activity. The AdSurv app builds upon
the Open Data Kit (ODK)1, an open source Android data
collection application. The mobile app has data collection
forms which are used for capturing details about the sub-
ject of interest. These include the image of the plant, a label
classifying the type of image, and a GPS reading of the lo-
cation from which the data is being collected. The data is
uploaded to a centralized server and automatically mapped
in real-time.
AdSurv back-end server: At the back-end, the system
uses a customized database application that receives data
from the Android application and runs some summary statis-
tics on the data to understand the number of uploads per
farmer, the trend of submissions, etc. The data is also
mapped as well as posted to a dashboard accessible to the
users of the system.
The web interface: The web interface2 to the applica-
tion consists of a mapping application and a dash board. The
mapping application uses Google Maps to populate the mo-
bile phone uploads to a live real-time map. The mapping
application is interactive and can be used to generate a heat
map version of the density of disease over the whole coun-
try. The dash board presents basic statistical summaries of
the upload report features, the data collected and the report-
ing trends.
Incentives structure
For crowdsourcing, the incentive structure is critical. Whilst
the pilot was not built to test what incentives work, we in-
variably ended up trying different incentives and compar-
ing the performance of the contributors based on the incen-
tives. In total we applied six different types of incentives
over the lifetime of the pilot. These were applied in a semi-
consecutive, semi-mixed fashion based on the numbers of
contributions that were coming in. These included the fol-
lowing.
1. Provision of equipment - at the onset of the pilot, we pro-
vided the participants with $100 smartphones with the
AdSurv app installed. Participants were required to sign a
contract that had as one of its provisions, continual own-
ership of the equipment being dependent on performance
in the crowdsourcing task.
2. Provision of mobile data credit - this incentive was mainly
to facilitate the sending of reports to the central server.
We iterated through different implementations of this. We
tried sending the data credit before upload of the reports,
we tried sending the credit on submission of the reports
and we tried monthly versus weekly credit disbursements.
3. Weekly and monthly prompts - we maintained a weekly
communication by text SMS to every participant and a
monthly telephone follow up call. These were mainly re-
minder alerts. These were initially quite effective.
1https://opendatakit.org
2https://adsurv.mcrops.org
4. Provision of a focused subject for the week - we termed
this subject surveillance to imply the participants were re-
quested to report on very specific phenomena every week.
This was in response to feedback from the participants
sending the same thing every time.
5. Provision of feedback - here we provided the participants
with some form of analysis from the images they had up-
loaded.
6. Provision of micropayments - at some point in the pilot,
we started providing direct monetary rewards with a pay-
per-report model. We varied the amounts of micropay-
ment during the pilot resulting in different responses from
the participants.
Incentives were mostly applied in a relatively ad hoc man-
ner, without a predefined schedule. They were mainly in
response to feedback from participants explaining varying
trends in the reports uploaded to the system. The incentives
were also combined randomly from time to time over the
pilot period of 76 weeks.
The incentives issued to motivate participation and report-
ing were generally allowed to run for as long as the agents
were reporting above the desired compliance threshold level.
Compliance threshold was set to 10 reports per week on a
particular task. Some incentives were sustained longer than
others.
Results
The pilot was set up to collect near real-time surveillance
data on cassava diseases in Uganda. To this end, more than
7,000 reports was collected over a period of 76 weeks. This
is about a third of the expected number of reports from a
group of 29 participants over that same period.
One plausible explanation for this number is that we had
some of the participants drop out of the pilot, when equip-
ment was stolen or when the equipment did not work as
was the case with GPS on some of the devices. GPS was
a mandatory field on the form so participants were unable to
send in reports if they were not geo-coded. Figure 2a depicts
the reports collected over the different regions of Uganda.
Figure 2b shows the corresponding timeseries of the report
uploads over the 76 weeks of the pilot. The next sections
explain the trends observed in these figures.
Most of the reports were of images depicting disease, fol-
lowed by other types of images including farmer images,
images of roots harvested etc. Images of whitefly infested
leaves and anomalous images were the lowest recorded of
the 7000. This is because the crop experts who were the
biggest contributing group were mostly interested in disease
related data from all around the country. This was also influ-
enced the nature of subject surveillance calls made during
the pilot.
While the system was setup to collect surveillance data,
we eventually got involved in understanding how the differ-
ent incentives affected the participation of the crowd. The
next two sections present results from these other dimen-
sions of the pilot.
(a) Spatial submission of reports (b) Trend of report submission
Figure 2: Reports collected using AdSurv system; spatial and timeseries dimensions.
Reporting by agent category
Figures 3a and 3b present a depiction of the contributions of
the different types of agents in the pilot. Figure 3a provides
single examples of individuals from the different participant
categories while Figure 3b provides the overall trend of re-
porting for all participants across the different categories. As
is evident the experts who travel around the country more of-
ten have a wider spatial spread of contributions compared to
the other categories of participants. In general, our findings
were that each of the volunteer categories in the pilot ex-
hibited unique participation behaviours, and were motivated
differently by different incentives. More specifically;
- Farmer agents tended to report strictly from their locali-
ties or regions for the entire period of the pilot. Even for
very active and consistent farmer agents like farmer agent
17 (Figure 3a), with a total submission of over 700 reports,
most of the reports are submitted from a very specific lo-
cation. We found that these farmer agents are more influ-
enced by non-monetary incentives especially communica-
tion type incentives like follow up calls and SMS message
alerts. They also mostly reacted positively to reputation
type incentives.
- Extension service agents are also closer to the farmer
agents in terms of their spatial spread. Figure 3a depicts
the report contribution from a typical extension service
agent. The limited spatial spread is probably because ex-
tension service members, such as district agricultural crop
inspectors and district production officers, are localised in
their operations and assignments. Overall we found these
to be the least performing and the least influenced by di-
rect monetary type rewards and yet their nature of work
gives them access to many farmers fields on a regular ba-
sis.
- For expert agents, we notice significant spatial spread of
the collections. An example of a typical expert agents col-
lection is depicted in Figure 3a. Many of the expert agents
reported from areas other than their research station local-
ities, many times covering disparate regions of the coun-
try. We found that expert agents are most influenced by
higher direct monetary reward incentives and they gener-
ally posted higher quality reports especially on the subject
surveillance matters probably because of the specialised
knowledge they possess. The expert agents generally re-
ported from disparate areas across the country possibly
while they were carrying out their routine field activities.
- For the partner agents, we generally noticed a pattern be-
tween that exhibited by the experts and that exhibited by
the farmers - some localisation in the collection yet at the
same time some leanings towards sparsity. The partner
agents were particularly most influenced by the introduc-
tion of direct monetary rewards. This is a behaviour that is
very interesting for further research.
Reporting trends by category
Figure 3b depicts the reporting trends for the different cat-
egories of participants or agents in the crowd over the 76
week period of the pilot. We make specific observations
based on this.
- For the first twenty weeks, mobile phone data
credit/airtime facilitation was provided to the agents
to report on the surveillance tasks. Several follow up calls
were also made to the agents, explaining the high peaks in
the first few weeks. However, we notice a steady decline
in reporting over the twenty weeks with the two major
incentives. From the 20th to the 30th week, there are
several weeks where the agents were not provided weekly
data airtime, but a constant stream of 2 SMS messages
per week were broadcast to them. The participants over
this period generally maintained a compliant level of
reporting.
- Subject surveillance is where a specific subject of inter-
est to the crowdsourcer is broadcast to the agents as a
(a) Example submissions per category (b) Trends per category
Figure 3: Reports collected using AdSurv system; depiction of the different user categories.
surveillance task for each week. This was introduced in
the 30th week, which led to the slight rise in reporting
in the 31st week. This however, gradually decays over 10
weeks, even with a steady facilitation with weekly data
airtime to support the subject surveillance tasks. The sub-
ject surveillance tasks were doubled in the 37th week but
do not register any success in influencing the reporting up-
wards. Reporting for this period continued to steadily de-
cline even with weekly data airtime facilitation provided.
- In the 42nd week we introduced a direct monetary re-
ward incentive where agents were directly rewarded based
on the number of reports submitted. Micropayments were
done on a per report basis. The first reward amount was
250 Ugandan shillings (approx. 5 cts USD) per report
which run for 12 weeks from the 42nd to the 54th week.
This was only able to slightly affect the reporting trends in
the 43rd, 45th and 46th weeks combined with other incen-
tives of weekly data airtime provided to agents and subject
surveillance task being broadcast every week.
- In the 55th week, the direct monetary reward was in-
creased from 250 Ugandan shillings to 500 Ugandan
shillings per report, and we immediately saw a steady rise
in reporting trends from the agents from the 55th to the
60th week of the pilot. This was coupled with follow up
calls and SMS messages to let the agents know of the new
incentive of direct monetary rewards for reports sent in,
and a broadcast of two subject surveillance tasks in the
same period of time. This caused 3 peaks of reports in the
57th, 59th and 63rd weeks with majority of the reports
coming from the experts and the partner agents.
- In the 56th week, the weekly data airtime facilitation was
withdrawn immediately after the increase of direct mone-
tary reward which was structured to be paid after an agent
submitted reports. This seemed not to have a positive ef-
fect on the farmers and extension service agents.
- The great peak in week 68, was largely due to a retrain-
ing and retooling exercise we held for the agents who had
adhered to compliance of posting on average 100 reports
for at least 60 weeks from the start of the pilot. After the
retraining and retooling seminar, we see a steep rise in
agents contributions for weeks of 67-68 but which then
steeply drops to slightly above 200 reports per week. At
this point only two groups of agents are active i.e. experts
and partner agents.
- For the reminder of the pilot, we applied a direct mone-
tary reward for reports, subject surveillance coupled with
weekly SMS message alerts to agents. These were most
exploited by the expert and partner agents. We see a grad-
ual decline in overall reporting trends still from the 70th
week onwards.
Effect of incentives
In this pilot, the effect of incentives on the reporting trends
generally varies with the type of incentive or more precisely
with the type of incentives mixed at any one point. Gener-
ally for all bundles of incentives, we notice a positive effect
at the onset of the incentive and then a gradual decline to
some steady state. The different agent categories are also
influenced differently by the different incentives. More gen-
erally we observe the following.
1. Incentives played a crucial part in motivating reporting
from autonomous agents in disparate areas across the
country for the period of 76 weeks.
2. All the agents were strongly motivated by the mobile
smartphones that were given to them for the surveillance
task at the start of the pilot program. This lasted a couple
of weeks.
3. Farmers seem to be most motivated by the non-monetary
incentives like communication-type incentives. We ob-
served that they reported more after a followup call was
made which was done about once every four weeks. Dur-
ing the first 20 weeks of the pilot, reputation type rewards
were used where we broadcast the best performers of the
week. This was a big motivation for farmer agents and yet
did not influence much the experts and partner agents.
4. We found that the partner agents were the least influenced
of all the categories by facilitation incentives and non-
monetary rewards like communication incentives of SMS
messages, subject surveillance and follow up calls.
5. The direct monetary rewards of pay-per-report most in-
centivised the crop experts and the partner agents and
were not able to positively influence the reporting from
farmer and extension service agents.
6. We noticed that the higher the direct monetary reward, the
higher the participation of experts and to a small extent,
partner agents. With a direct monetary reward, experts and
partner agents were more motivated to report.
Each bundle of incentives were able to generally sustain
a reporting trend for on average 10 weeks. With such incen-
tives applied periodically and interchangeably for every 10
weeks on average, it seems possible to incentivise this par-
ticular crowd for desired participation and reporting.
Discussion on challenges
During the pilot, we encountered several challenges, some
technical, and some social. Many of the interventions and
incentive changes during the pilot were a response to one
of these challenges. For some we had no immediate solu-
tion or the solution was too expensive (in terms of resources
and time) for us to implement in the pilot. The challenges
generally included:
1. Most of the farmer and extension service agents were not
very conversant with using mobile smartphone technolo-
gies. They largely have and use feature phones. This put
a direct strain on the training budgets and most of the
problems faced during the period of 76 weeks were con-
cerned with using the mobile AdSurv app on the smart-
phone. However, over time the agents were able to oper-
ate some social media mobile apps, navigate the phone-
book, use the camera, make calls and message with the
mobile smartphone with relatively much more ease. Per-
haps future research efforts may investigate a gamified
crowdsourcing smartphone app, and increasing the util-
ity features of the app to include for example commodity
market information, news channels for high yielding plant
materials etc.
2. When provided with weekly data facilitation, some of the
agents used the data bundles for their own purposes like
chatting on social media apps, and exhausted it well be-
fore being able to submit any reports. This behaviour was
most dominant when weekly data facilitation was sent to
them at the beginning of the week for example on Monday
and Tuesday before they had to upload reports on Friday.
After a follow up call and survey in the 9th week, it was
noticed that most of the agents preferred submitting their
weekly collections at the end of the week on days like
Friday and Saturday. Starting with week 11, data facili-
tation was posted to the agents weekly on Fridays. This
improved submissions somewhat.
3. We had many challenges related to the agents accessing
mobile telephone internet with their handsets. This re-
sulted into demotivation for some of the agents after sev-
eral failed attempts at submitting reports. We got several
complaints of non payments for reports which had sup-
posedly been sent. It was unclear whether they were actu-
ally sent and lost during transmission or otherwise. From
time to time, we advised the agents to collect the data and
find township areas that have a good mobile internet cov-
erage so as to send the reports uninterrupted. This how-
ever, was not as forth coming especially for agents located
in rural places.
4. There was a significant problem with agents being unable
to send the reports because the GPS coordinates on the
app could not resolve or because they took more than 15
minutes to resolve on the phone. It was unclear whether
this was due to poor connectivity or due to low quality
GPS sensors in the mobile devices. Because this was a
required field for the report, this quickly became a point
of frustration for the agents in those areas, many times
demotivating some of the agents leading to a poor and
irregular performance. We made several technical visits
to these places to ascertain the cause and for most cases
we found the experience of getting GPS coordinates was
as described (taking more than 15 min). For the most part,
this was a mobile device dependent problem.
5. Some of the agents lost, broke and were robbed of their
equipment which reduced the number of contributing
agents from 29 to 27 agents in total. There was no way
to know if the stories of lost phones were true or not.
6. Many of the agents from the rural areas and the older vol-
unteers (above 60 years of age) were not conversant with
usage of mobile smart phone technology. In the training
sessions, we found that they comprehended better when
guided by their fellow farmers, mostly in a local dialect.
Future training will take into consideration decentralised
training programs customised to the language require-
ments of that particular region, delivered by experienced
model farmers.
7. With the increase of the direct monetary reward we ex-
perienced scenaries where an agent would report many
reports from within a very small restricted locality. This
was especially so with the partner agents. We observed
numbers of reports for particular agents and experts shoot
up from 12 to over 70 per week when the micropayment
incentive was increased to 500 UGX per report. This was
later countered by putting a limit on how many reports
would be paid for from the same village per week. The
limit was set to a maximum of 35 rewardable reports.
Recommendations from the pilot
The pilot of the mobile ad hoc surveillance system brought
to light some pertinent issues in working with voluntary par-
ticipants from rural areas. Some unaccounted for factors like
the different levels of expertise, different literacy levels were
found to affect the quality of data collected and the fre-
quency of reporting. Some recommendations on what key
factors to consider in deploying such a system include:
1. Incentives play an important role in motivating the inter-
est of voluntary participation, even more importantly a re-
wards scheme through which to determine how rewards
are earned. Any future research would be to understand
the necessary utility considerations for designing such a
rewards incentive scheme that can adaptively incentivise
agents for high quality participation.
2. From the agent behaviours observed when provided facil-
itation type incentives e.g. mobile data credit, the time lag
between issuing the incentive and broadcasting the sub-
ject for the next surveillance task should be minimised
to not more than a day. This recommendation applies to
crowdsourcing schemes where the duration of 1 week is
still considered near real-time.
3. Under this work we register the importance of training.
For crowds that are mainly rural based, there is need for
regular retraining and retooling programs. These could be
a combination of online training via phone and onground
live training sessions.
4. A communication strategy is key to such a framework.
Particularly a strategy that emphasizes feedback to the
crowd was found to be of critical importance for this type
of work.
5. We found that social dynamics should be considered when
implementing this type of system. We found not all partic-
ipants were affected or responded the same towards cer-
tain incentives. While we did not do a rigorous study on
this, we found that such dynamics as gender, age, social
status, etc had a huge influence on the performance of the
participants within this system.
Contributions
This work sought to find the most optimal setup possible
to crowdsource all year round real-time surveillance data
from volunteer agents in disparate rural agricultural local-
ities around the country, and eventually to understand what
types of incentives would be effective in motivating such a
crowd. Whilst the pilot was not explicitly set up to measure
the incentive mechanism, we still observe some contribu-
tions from implementing this and tweaking incentives over
76 weeks. We summarise the contributions of this work as
follows.
1. We present a crowdsourcing based system to address a
real world problem in Uganda. We provide the requisite
evidence for using the said system to actually collect over
7000 reports from a crowd consisting of four categories of
people. The contribution is in how to set up such a system
as well as the experiences in getting this working.
2. We also present a live example of how manipulating dif-
ferent incentives can affect the outcomes of a crowdsourc-
ing task such as this. Particularly we talk about differently
motivated intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and the effect
on the crowd of varying them. However working on a real
problem with real people presents its unique challenges,
for example having a device stolen or having the tech-
nology fail can not be solved by improving the incentive
mechanism.
3. For people particularly interested in this particular prob-
lem of crowdsourcing crop health surveillance data per-
haps for other crops apart from cassava, we provide an
analysis of the different categories of the crowd and how
they respond to different motivations. For example the
more experienced members of the crowd respond differ-
ently to different types of incentives. Overall the social
dynamics of the crowd in their localities also plays a big
role, even though we were not able to demonstrate that
concretely in this work.
Limitations of study
The focus of this work was to understand how agricul-
tural actors participate in a mobile crowdsourcing setup for
surveillance of cassava viral disease and pests, by drawing
insights from observations on reporting patterns of individu-
als contributors, behaviours of their sub-groupings, their re-
sponse to different incentives and the effectiveness of train-
ing exercises for rural crowds. It also looked at early benefits
such a system presents in bridging the current gaps in mon-
itoring of crop health.
While we provide insights based on 76 weeks of piloting
this system, we did not set it up systematically at the onset
as a controlled experiment, and as such the conclusions from
this work need to be looked at in that light. However it is also
important to note that it is very hard to have a controlled ex-
periment for an actual problem like this where the actors are
playing in a rural field that we have no control over. Things
like stolen phones, the actors falling sick, or getting involved
in other activities do affect the outputs of such a system and
it would be hard to tie them to the incentive mechanism for
example.
Conclusion
This work harnessed the ubiquity of farmer communities
and crowds using smartphones, to provide all year-round
near real-time surveillance and monitoring data of cassava
viral diseases and pests in Uganda as a supplement to the
standard cassava crop surveys carried out annually. We ob-
tained 7000 reports which is about one third of the expected
number of reports if the system were operating in a very
controlled environment with no phones stolen, no technical
difficulties, and everyone motivated to send in data over 76
weeks. The goal is to eventually use this data to build an au-
tomated diagnostic tool for cassava diseases as well as use
the data to provide a real time situation map of the state of
disease in the whole country. Several issues come out of this
work that require further investigation for example the social
dynamics of this particular crowd, how to control the quality
of images uploaded in such a system and how to incentivize
the different categories of the crowd. This will form the sub-
stance of our future work.
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